The objective of this analysis is mainly to construct an intuitive measure of the performance of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) in India -a nation-wide poverty alleviation programme which was introduced in 2005. The focus is on excess demand at the district level. Some related issues addressed are (i) whether excess demand responds to poverty, and (ii) whether recent hikes in NREGS wages are inflationary. Our analysis confirms responsiveness of excess demand to poverty. Also, apprehensions expressed about the inflationary potential of recent hikes in NREGS wages have been confirmed. More importantly, higher NREGS wages are likely to undermine self-selection of the poor in it. So, in order to realise the poverty reducing potential of this scheme, a policy imperative is to ensure a speedier matching of demand and supply in districts that are highly poverty prone, as also to avoid the trade-offs between poverty reduction and inflation.
National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, Poverty and Prices in
Rural India
I. Introduction
There has been a spate of studies designed to assess the performance of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS hereafter) during two years of its existence 3 . Various commentators have drawn attention to huge leakages and fudging of muster rolls, while others have been ecstatic over the number of jobs created, and number of beneficiaries from disadvantaged groups such as the Scheduled Tribes (ST), Scheduled
Castes (SC) and women. So it is hardly surprising that many have debunked this nationwide programme while others have given a strong endorsement on the grounds that it is beginning to transform the lives of the poor and making them better aware of their entitlements. In a broad sense, one view does not entirely negate the other, as impact assessment involves several different elements. From this perspective, we have constructed a few intuitive indicators and illustrated their implications for the success or failure of this intervention. The issue is an important one, as the recent decision to extend it to all 604 districts with an employment guarantee of 100 days per household is likely to be a huge fiscal burden (about Rs 53000 crore) -especially when the public finances of both the central and state governments are in disarray.
Our analysis is built around the following indicators: demand for and supply of NREGS jobs, excess demand (or the gap between them), and whether excess demand has widened in the last two years (i.e. 2007-08 and 2008-09) , and the underlying factors 4 . We also examine whether excess demand is sensitive to headcount poverty ratio, and whether higher NREGS wages are likely to be inflationary, as highlighted in recent media reports.
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These indicators of supply and demand are an improvement on simplistic and arguably flawed estimates given on the NREGS website (http://nrega.nic.in/). For a sub-sample of 6 states, at the district level, the gap between supply and demand is 0 or almost 0 in most cases, suggesting a perfect matching. Given substantial evidence of fudging of muster rolls, and inaccurate estimation of demand (for lack of awareness, among other reasons), the estimates on the NREGS website cannot be taken at face value. So we measure these indicators with a modicum of economic theory (i.e. by linking them to "prices"). These estimates are then used to obtain more refined excess demand estimates. Briefly, the lower the excess demand, the more successful is NREGS. We then proceed to analyse 4 We have followed Indranil Dutta's suggestion that 'demand-supply gap' should be replaced by 'excess demand'. In applying this terminology, however, it is necessary to bear in mind that, while in a stable competitive equilibrium excess demand will lead to a higher price and a convergence to equilibrium, such a mechanism is unlikely to work as NREGS wages are also influenced by budgetary constraints and political cycles. So, if NREGS wages do not rise to clear the market because of these constraints there will be rationing of NREGS jobs. Arguably, this seems an appropriate characterisation of the scheme in question. A related issue is whether excess demand has any relevance as a performance indicator after the former drops to 0. In principle, this is a valid comment except that it overlooks that the disequilibrium may persist for some time. We owe this clarification to Raghbendra Jha. 5 A recent report in The Economic Times states that "states such as Rajasthan raised the minimum wage from Rs 70 to Rs 100 in the last one year while some others doubled it during the period." (Prasad and Antony, 2009). whether excess demand responds to variation in the incidence of poverty. In other words, we ask whether more people demand this entitlement if there is more poverty in a district.
Finally, we examine the likely impact of hikes in minimum NREGS wage rates on CPIAL (Consumer Price Index for Agricultural Labourers).
Much of the data are obtained from the NREGS website (http://nrega.nic.in/) and Reserve budget constraints, the analysis is based on data for six major states viz., Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, and Uttar Pradesh. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II sketches the rationale of NREGS. The estimation strategy for excess demand for NREGS is outlined in Section III, and the corresponding regression results are discussed in Section IV. Section V turns to the sensitiveness of excess demand to variation in inter-district poverty. Section VI econometrically investigates whether hikes in NREGS wages are likely to be inflationary. The final section offers concluding observations with some policy implications.
II. Workfare
Since workfare is an important feature of poverty alleviation, it warrants a critical review.
In doing so, the incentive aspects are examined below 6 .
The incentive case for workfare in poverty alleviation rests on two arguments. One is the screening argument, i.e. a work-requirement tends to exclude the non-poor (or, more generally, the relatively affluent). The other is the deterrent argument, i.e., the workrequirement does not deter poverty-reducing investments (say, in human capital). These are considered in turn below.
The screening argument is motivated by administrative difficulties in identifying the poor. Abilities are not directly observable. Although earnings could yield some clues, their estimates tend to be patchy and unreliable. Given these difficulties, self-selection mechanisms such as work-requirement are appealing. Under certain conditions, it can be shown that work-requirement is a cost-minimizing poverty alleviation strategy (as compared with uniform transfers). Assuming that the poor work in the labour market without any workfare scheme and that they can allocate their labour between agriculture and workfare, the work-requirement will reduce their earnings from elsewhere. It will thus necessitate larger transfers to get them out of poverty than those offered by the targeted intervention, with monetary transfer corresponding to the wage earnings under workfare, given that the latter would not lose the incentives to work in agriculture. This is the cost of self-selection through work-requirement; but there is also a cost reduction on account of lower transfers to the non-poor (as their incentive to masquerade as poor is class' of labourer (Himmelfarb, 1984, p.163) . Further "It is only ….by making relief in all cases less agreeable than wages, that anything deserving the name of improvement can be hoped for" (Himmelfarb, 1984, p.165) . For a review, see Gaiha, 2000 , 2001 , 2007 , Gaiha and Imai, 2006 , Jha et al. 2008 , Jha, Bhattacharya, Gaiha, Shankar, 2009 , Jha, et al., 2009a weakened). There is a particular work-requirement which resolves this trade-off optimally, provided that the poor are a small fraction of the population and their earning potential is limited.
The deterrent argument takes a different form. Transfers reduce the returns to effort and thus induce individuals to choose a lower level of effort. This increases the number of poor, as also the cost of poverty alleviation. Under certain conditions, however, workfare is optimal. There is a particular work-requirement which induces income-enhancing choices, provided that the share of the poor in the population is small, and their earning potential is low 7 .
As argued elsewhere, high NREGS wages undermine the screening and deterrent arguments which favour workfare. For example, in the context of the Employment Guarantee Scheme in Maharashtra, which started in the 1970s and served as the benchmark for NREGS, the hike in wages following a High Court directive in 1988 caused a worsening of targeting over the period 1979-89 (Gaiha, 2000 (Gaiha, , 2001 (Gaiha, , 2007 8 .
Although there were several reasons as sketched below, the hike in EGS wages was a key factor.
As the EGS wage exceeded the agricultural wage, exclusion of the non-poor (through a work-requirement) became harder and the poor were 'crowded out '. Simultaneously, 7 This summarises the exposition in Besley and Coate (1992) . For a review, see Gaiha (2000 Gaiha ( , 2001 Gaiha ( , 2007 , Gaiha and Imai (2006) and Jha et al. (2009a, b) . 8 These analyses are based on the ICRISAT panel survey of villages in Maharashtra.
given the budget constraint, there was 'rationing' of employment through delays in registration for employment and opening of new work-sites, and offer of less remunerative tasks. An issue then is whether the poor bore the brunt of it. In fact, they did. Delays in registration added to the gap between registration and offer of work, and discouraged the poor more than others, as the poor tend to live hand-to-mouth. Equally, if the distance to be travelled increases because of the restrictions on new work-sites, the less energetic poor in particular would be discouraged to participate in the scheme.
Moreover, there is some evidence that over time corruption has increased. Given their limited network of relationships, however, the poor are typically at a greater disadvantage and thus more likely to be excluded or underpaid. Tightening of rural labour markets also resulted in the withdrawal of some poor from the EGS. Expansion of employment opportunities through the EGS in irrigated regions -mostly in sugarcane cutting-is a case in point. Although there are 'costs' of migration in the switch from agriculture to the EGS among others (e.g. disruption of family life), the compensations, such as an advance from the labour contractor, and timely and regular wage payments, would justify the expansion of the EGS.
III. Estimation of Excess Demand
The NREGS website reports number of households who demanded work and number of jobs provided at the district level in 2007-08 and 2008-09.
As may be noted from As noted earlier, however, given the large scale fudging of muster rolls, corruption in the payment of wages, and inflated records of jobs provided, these estimates of excess demand cannot be taken at face value. Using basic economic theory, the demand and supply estimates are refined and purged to some extent of measurement errors. We do so in the following way. it stands for logarithm of the demand for NREGS jobs in district i and year t, and d denotes demand. The higher the NREGS wage relative to the agricultural wage, the greater is the demand for NREGS jobs. If NREGS is considered an 'inferior' good or option, given the strenuous and unskilled nature of work (e.g., digging of earth and carrying of headloads of it), the positive relationship between demand and NREGS wages would weaken at higher levels. Hence we have used both the level and square of NREGS wages. Unfortunately, as we did not have easy access to district level agricultural wage rates, we have used NREGS wage as a proxy for the (relative) NREGS wage. We have also posited a non-linear relationship between the transformed NREGS demand and income inequality measured by the Gini/Lorenz coefficient, and its square. Specifically, controlling for the effects of other variables, under certain conditions, the higher the inequality, the fewer will be rewarding employment opportunities and the higher will be NREGS demand. Other things being equal, the more economically backward a state is (specifically, whether it is one of the BIMARU states 10 ), the higher will be demand for guaranteed employment of the NREGS kind. Given the results of this specification, we obtain more refined estimates of demand at the district level. is an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) error term. 9 It is noted that because we take the first lag in equation (2) Indeed, given the nature of demand and lack of precision in measuring it, in general, it is plausible that demand is underreported because of continuing limited awareness of such interventions in remote areas. In that case, excess of supply over demand is more desirable than excess of demand over a certain range.
Whether excess demand varies with poverty is examined with the help of equation (3 In the final specification, we examine the likely impact of sharp spikes in NREGS wages in a few states on the Consumer Price Index for Agricultural Labourers in Rural Areas (CPIAL). As we did not have easy access to NREGS wages for two years while agricultural wages were available for two consecutive years but at the state level, we preferred the latter as a proxy for NREGS wages. Other explanatory variables used are CPIAL in the previous year, state revenue-expenditure deficit, its square, and funds available.
Algebraically,
where log CPIAL st is the CPIAL index for state k and year t, denotes state revenue deficit/surplus, is its square, Agwages denote annual agricultural wage rate (for males) in 2005 and 2006, respectively, and 4kt ε is the iid error term.
IV. Results (a) Determinants of Demand and Supply
We shall consider NREGS demand estimation first, followed by supply estimation. Their implications for excess demand are then analysed, followed by whether excess demand varies with district poverty and whether hikes in NREGS wages are inflationary. Table 2 presents the regression results of demand equation. As hypothesised, the higher the NREGS wage, the greater was the demand for it in 2007-08 as in Case A of Table 2 .
However, the effect of the square of NREGS wage was negative and significant, suggesting higher valuation of leisure beyond a certain NREGS wage. The greater the income inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient or Lorenz ratio), the greater was the demand for the NREGS. If income inequality is a manifestation of inequality in physical and human capital, it may imply oligopsonistic labour markets and lower employment and/or wages 12 . The coefficient of the square of the Gini was, however, negative and 12 For some illustrative evidence, see Gaiha (1995) .
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significant. It may be conjectured that this is consistent with a floor to agricultural employment and wage rate 13 . Controlling for these effects, the demand was higher in districts belonging to BIMARU states. The overall specification is validated by the F test. 2. Robust estimator is based on the Huber-White heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator.
Similar results are obtained with the data for 2008-09. We report the results of OLS and robust estimation in Case B and Case C, respectively. NREGS demand is positively related to the wage rate and negatively to its square; the effect of the Gini is again positive and that of its square negative; and, finally, districts in BIMARU states had higher demand. But the coefficients differ in their magnitudes. For example, the effect of NREGS wage rate was considerably higher in 2008-09, as also that of the Gini. Note also that the sample for 2008-09 is considerably larger than that for 2007-08. 13 See Jha et al. (2009b) for recent evidence on nutrition-poverty trap in rural India.
Turning to supply of NREGS jobs, note first that the ordinary least squares estimates for 2007-08 suffer from heteroscedasticity (Case A of Table 3 ). Accordingly, we shall comment on the robust regression results in Case B of 14 In an alternative specification, the lagged revenue deficit and ∆ deficit were used as explanatory variables (the latter as an alternative to current deficit). The latter, however, does not have a significant effect for year 2007-08, as shown in (Case A) of Annex 2. Robust estimator is based on the Huber-White heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator.
(b) Excess Demand
Let us now turn to excess demand in 2007-08 and 2008-09. We construct estimates of excess demand first for a common sample of 142 districts in both years. Table 4 In order to make an overall assessment of performance, let us turn to In all six states, there was a widening of excess demand, regardless of whether initially it was positive or negative. Broadly, this could be attributed to greater awareness among the poor of their entitlement. 2. Based on robust estimator based on the Huber-White heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator.
VI. NREGS Wage and CPIAL
In this section, our focus is on whether hikes in NREGS wages are likely to be inflationary. For lack of easy access to district level wage rates, we have used agricultural wage rates as a proxy for NREGS wage rates. Both OLS and robust regressions are Table 7 .
Although homoscedasticity is not rejected at the 5 per cent level, we shall comment briefly on the robust regression results as well. In the OLS results, agricultural wage (lagged by one year) has a significant negative effect on CPIAL while the contemporaneous wage has a positive effect. None of the remaining variables have significant effects. The robust regression results, however, differ. First, revenue deficit has a significant positive effect on CPIAL, as also the square of the deficit. So, higher deficits are inflationary. Given the negative effect of agricultural wage (lagged by one year), the higher contemporaneous wage has a positive effect. Altogether thus higher wages are inflationary.
In sum, to the extent that NREGS and agricultural wage rates move in tandem, our analysis suggests that controlling for other factors, hikes in NREGS wages may have inflationary effects. Thus, again given the significance of coefficient of the later, the inflationary potential of higher agricultural wage rate (a proxy for delta NREGS wage rate) can not be ruled out.
VII. Concluding Observations
The objective of this analysis was mainly to construct an intuitive measure of NREGS performance-focusing on excess demand/demand-supply gaps, changes in their distribution between 2007 and 2009, and whether excess demand became more responsive to poverty and whether hikes in NREGS wages are likely to be inflationary.
Our analysis suggests that excess demand widened slightly in the aggregate of six states during the period in question. At the state level, in Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, the gap narrowed substantially. By contrast, Bihar and Uttar Pradeshespecially the former-witnessed a sharp widening of excess demand.
With the same sample of districts in both years, and using a measure of standardised excess demand, the distribution in 2008-09 became more concentrated in the neighbourhoods of 0, implying smaller deviations from the mean. However, with the comparison based on the larger sample of districts in 2008-09, the concentration is much less pronounced.
Further investigations focused on the relationship between (normalised) monthly per capita expenditure and (normalised) excess demand at the district level. Our analysis reveals a non-linear relationship -the gaps rise over similar ranges of income to the left of 0, fall over ranges to the right of 0 and rise again. What is also significant is that at MPCE lower than 0 the gaps were larger in 2008-09 but at higher MPCEs these were lower than corresponding gaps in 2007-08.
Our analysis of estimated excess demand further reveals that not only was it sensitive to poverty but it became more so over time in districts that were common in both 2007-08
and 2008-09. The significance of this finding lies in more poor demanding their entitlement.
If our analysis has any validity, apprehensions expressed about the inflationary potential of recent hikes in NREGS wages cannot be ruled out. Further corroboration is, however, required from a more detailed analysis. But no less important is the concern that higher NREGS wages (relative to agricultural wage rates) may undermine the self-selection of the poor in it.
In conclusion, far from losing steam, NREGS displays greater sensitiveness to demand from the poor in districts that were covered in both years in question. However, realisation of its potential for poverty reduction depends crucially on whether excess demand is reduced at a faster pace in highly poverty prone districts and whether tradeoffs between poverty reduction and inflation are avoided. Table A 
Annex

.2 Distribution of Districts by Normalised Demand -Supply Gap
Although a chi-square test does not confirm significant changes in the relative frequencies of districts in the specified demand-supply gap intervals, there are large changes in specific intervals over the period in question. A few illustrations suffice.
In the gap ranges 0-0.05, the share of districts fell from 5.56 per cent to 3.91 districts; as also in the next higher range, 0.05-0.10, there was a reduction (from 6.25 per cent to 4.35 per cent). At higher ranges, the relative frequencies rose from 2.78 per cent to 3.48 per cent in the range 0. Normalized Demand Supply Gaps 
